Knowledge and Information LO30905

From: Mark W. McElroy (mmcelroy@vermontel.net)
Date: 01/21/04


Replying to LO30900 --

Dear Terje:

You said:

Is there a place called Singapore or not? Yes or no? If you landed at
Singapore airport, and someone asked "are you in Singapore?" Would you
say "not in universal terms"?

My reply:

I would say yes, I think, because I would know the sense in which they
were asking the question. But that is not to say that 'Singapore is a
place' is universally true. This all started with you claiming that
the statement 'Singapore is a place' is obviously true and that to
think otherwise would be "blatantly absurd." I have simply shown that
there are instances in which Singapore is not a place, in which case
it is not blatantly absurd to say as much, and that saying so is quite
true contrary to your feelings on the matter. In those cases, the
statement 'Singapore is a place' is false. It is a nation-state and
not a place at all.

You then quoted me as saying:

> Next, that '1+1=2' is also not always true. We know this from
> Einstein's relativity theory, and there are also many cases where
> adding two things together does not necessarily result in a sum of
> two. If I add two drops of water together, I get only one drop, not
> two.

Then you said:

Before you added them together were they two drops or not? 1+1=2
doesn't mean that that counted elements can't ever transfor into
something else. There is no element of time in the equation. I said
1+1=2, (a count) you answered, "no, because 1+1=>1 or 2 or 3 etc." (a
transformation).

My reply:

Sorry, Terje, this doesn't work for me. The fact that your equation
has the kind of variability you speak of and can be interpreted in
more than one way illstrates my point. Namely, that when you specify
or invoke a certain set of rules for determining truth (i.e., logic,
inference, math, etc.), truth becomes a function of the rules you're
using -- no more, no less. To say that 1+1=2 according to mathematics
is say nothing at all about the real world. Rather, it simply quotes
a truth according to the logic of mathematics. And since it agrees
with itself, I say 'so what'? Two drops of water added togtether in
the real world still make one drop, not two.

And so to say that I misinterpreted your rules (of math in this case)
is not to say that your rules are reliable, nor is it to tell us
anything at all about the real world. It just tells us what your
rules are.

You said:

Moreover, how do you "know" that Einstein existed? Or that there there
is such a theory? If you doubt his existence, why should I bother
myself to answer this e-mail that you are also not sure exists? How
does one accept an argument one is not sure exists made by a man one
is not sure existed? How does one find the time to write e-mails one
is not sure exist?

My reply:

Fallibilism does not require the abandonment of all hope for truth.
I can be a fallibilist even as I continue to seek the truth. Truth is
a regulative ideal. And the serach for truth has its ways and means,
even though we can never know for sure whether or not we have reached
it. Thus, we can nenver "justify" our beliefs, as the 'justified true
belief' definition of knowledge suggests. But we can be justified in
our CHOICES of one belief over another by virtue of how well such
beliefs fare in our tests and evaluations of them. And since most
fallibilists also believe that the real world exists, this ongoing
enterprise of getting closer to the truth is essential to our survival
and our capacity to adapt. In short, I believe Einstein existed, but
I cannot be sure about that.

You then quoted me as saying:

> a colleague of mine, Mark Notturno, calls 'Floating
> Foundationalism': a doctrine that admits that there may not, in fact,
> be any foundational truths with certainty, but whose advocates carry
> on as though there were. To implicitly suggest that certain rules of
> inference are unassailable as premises, and that claims or conclusions
> derived from them should be regarded as true with certainty is to
> commit this error and to prove nothing at all.

Then you said:

I bet if your friend had a gun to his head or someone stole his wallet
he would have no doubts regarding their existence, or his own. If he
was drowning and shouting "Help! help!" and the people on the beach
responded "We are not sure you exist! Moreover, we are not sure you
need help!" would he shout back "You may be right! Carry on!"? Sounds
like a scene from a Monty Python show.

My reply:

As I said above, fallibility does not lead to relativism or skepticism
with regard to the world and whether or not it exists. The slippery
slope you imply here is fictitious. Most fallibilists I know of,
including myself, believe the world exists and that what we experience
through sensory perception and our intellect should all be taken very
seriously. In the process, we do the best we can to make sense of
what we experience, including crimes committed against us or scenes of
drowning bathers at the beach. And it is on the basis of all of that
we make decisions and take actions.

You then said:

This is nothing but sophistry.

My reply:

I think not, although I can see how your misinterpretation of my
statements and claims might make you think so. Still, is it sophistry
to say that rules of inference are inventions of ours? Or that the
application of such rules will lead to conclusions that we might not
reach had we been observing a different set of rules? I'm still
waiting for you to address that issue. Instead, you come back to me
with nothing more than reaffirmations of your rules (with a small dose
of ad hominem attack for good measure), as if the questions I raised
about them (the rules) had not been asked.

Regards,

Mark

-- 

"Mark W. McElroy" <mmcelroy@vermontel.net>

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